Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Publications

Economic Science Institute

4-22-2017

Smile, Dictator, You’re on Camera
Joy A. Buchanan
George Mason University

Matthew K. McMahon
George Mason University

Matthew Simpson
University of Missouri

Bart J. Wilson
Chapman University, bjwilson@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Buchanan, J. A., McMahon, M. K., Simpson, M. & Wilson, B. J. (2017). Smile, dictator, you're on camera. Southern Economic Journal,
84, 52–65. doi:10.1002/soej.12214

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Publications by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Smile, Dictator, You’re on Camera
Comments

This is the accepted version of the following article:
Buchanan, J. A., McMahon, M. K., Simpson, M. & Wilson, B. J. (2017). Smile, dictator, you're on camera.
Southern Economic Journal, 84, 52–65. doi:10.1002/soej.12214
which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1002/soej.12214. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Copyright

Southern Economic Association

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs/146

Smile, Dictator, You’re on Camera‡

Joy A. Buchanan, Matthew K. McMahon, Matthew Simpson, and Bart J. Wilson *
December 2016

Abstract: We investigate the degree to which people in a shopping mall express other-regarding
behavior in the dictator game. Whereas many studies have attempted to increase the social
distance between the dictator and experimenter and between the dictator and dictatee, we attempt
to minimize that social distance between random strangers by video recording the decisions with
the permission of the dictators to display their image on the Internet. Offers made by dictators
are high relative to other experiments and a nontrivial number give the entire experimental
windfall away, however a nontrivial number of people keep everything as well.
Key Words: experimental economics, social distance, dictator game
JEL Classifications: A13, C70, C93, D63

‡

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the International Foundation for Research in Experimental
Economics, Chapman University, and NSF grant SES 0833310. We also thank Jennifer Cunningham, Kyle
Bjordahl, Peter Abbate, Alexander Bogart, Michael Gamboa, and Stephen Pollard for assistance, and the MainPlace
Shopping Mall in Santa Ana, CA for their hospitality and permission to conduct this experiment on their premises,
and Larry Samuelson for comments that have improved the paper.
*
Joy Buchanan, George Mason University, joyabuchanan@gmail.com
Matthew K. McMahon, George Mason University, matt.mcman@gmail.com
Matthew Simpson, University of Missouri, themattsimpson@gmail.com
Bart J. Wilson, Chapman University, bartwilson@gmail.com

1

Abstract: We investigate the degree to which people in a shopping mall express other-regarding
behavior in the dictator game. Whereas many studies have attempted to increase the social
distance between the dictator and experimenter and between the dictator and dictatee, we attempt
to minimize that social distance between random strangers by video recording the decisions with
the permission of the dictators to display their image on the Internet. Offers made by dictators
are high relative to other experiments and a nontrivial number give the entire experimental
windfall away, however a nontrivial number of people keep everything as well.

2

I. Introduction
One of the most commonly conducted laboratory experiments is the dictator game, a
strategically simple game in which Player A divides some amount of money between himself
and another player. The dictator game was originally conceived as a variation of the ultimatum
game, in which Player A proposes a split of money that Player B can either accept or reject. In
the ultimatum game, Player A has strategic reasons to offer some amount of money to Player B,
to ensure that the offer is accepted, but in the dictator game there are no strategic concerns
because Player B cannot reject any allocation. The game-theoretic prediction is for Player A to
keep everything; nevertheless, in independent replicated experiments dictators consistently give
non-zero amounts (for a summary, see Camerer 2003). The distribution of offers is highly
sensitive to the experimental context, which is one reason experimentalists continue to conduct
further dictator-game experiments (for a discussion, see Smith 2008).
Forsythe et al. (1994; hereafter FHSS) conduct the first dictator game with monetary
rewards and compare their results to the ultimatum game to try to understand dictator
motivations as a taste for fairness. Hoffman et al. (1994; hereafter HMSS) and Schurter and
Wilson (2009) explore this concept further by assigning roles based on scores on a general
knowledge quiz. Allowing a participant to earn the right to be a dictator decreases offers
compared to offers in the baseline treatments, but does not reduce them all to (near) zero.
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996; hereafter HMS) use the degree of anonymity as a treatment
and find that procedures that increase anonymity decrease mean offers made by dictators.
Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) combine these treatments and add a high-stakes version.
With anonymity, earned wealth, and high stakes, dictators keep everything an astounding 97
percent of the time. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) conclude that it matters who earns the stakes:
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when dictators earn stakes, they offer nothing, but when recipients earn stakes, dictators offer
significant amounts. Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) redefine the choice set in the dictator game
to include the option of taking some money from the other person. They independently find that
this variation reduces offers significantly, and conclude that participant expectations and social
norms have a significant effect on dictator decisions. Etang, Fielding, and Knowles (2011) find
that Cameroonian villagers send more money to players who are from the same village as the
dictator. Hergueux and Jacquemet (2015) find that dictators participating on the Internet, where
social distance seems large, send more to the dictatee compared to dictators in a laboratory room.
In each of these experiments, strategic structure is typically modeled in the same way—as a
dictator game—but the distribution of offers varies significantly.
One common aim of dictator-game experiments is to identify

the conditions that

“produce rational behavior”—that is, to design treatments and procedures such that subjects
adhere to standard game-theoretic predictions (Cherry, Frykblom, and Jacquemet 2002, p. 1218).
These experiments isolate subjects, emphasize the fact that the game is a one-shot situation, and
make their decisions doubly anonymous. One notable exception is Frey and Bohnet (1995), who
take students from their own principles-of-microeconomics class and conduct treatments where
participants can identify one another or communicate with one another. They find that
identification brings the mean offer to half the endowment. Since this experiment was conducted
within a classroom setting, the students have the reasonable expectation of interacting in the
future, which their findings bear out. In another experiment, Eckel and Grossman (1996) use
doubly anonymous procedures with two recipients and find that players give more to the
American Red Cross than to an anonymous Player B. Finally, as evidence of just how socially
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sensitive dictators are, even with doubly anonymous procedures, Rigdon et al. (2009) find that
the weak social cue of three dots in the form of “watching eyes” increases dictator offers.
HMS describe their treatments as manipulations of the social distance between the
participants in the dictator game and the experimenter. Their dictator decisions are designed to
be completely anonymous in an attempt to maximize the social distance between the dictator and
the rest of the world. In this experiment, we attempt the opposite, to decrease the social distance
between random strangers as well as the experimenter and the world on the Internet relative to a
typical experiment conducted in a laboratory. We take the dictator game outside the laboratory
and record subjects’ decisions on video with permission to post the video on the Internet. To
what degree do people going about their daily lives express other-regarding behavior in the
dictator game? In addition, we analyze factors influencing a potential subject’s decision to either
participate or not participate in our experiment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II provides an overview of
our experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses, section III reports our results, and section
IV concludes with a discussion.

II. Experimental Design, Procedures, and Hypotheses
Traditionally, the dictator game is conducted in a laboratory among anonymous subjects
recruited from the undergraduate population at a university. Participants are separated before the
experiment begins and paid for their time. Instructions are designed to remove as much context
as possible from the decision and not activate what HMS refer to as the “unconscious,
preprogrammed rules of social exchange behavior” (p. 659).
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We created three treatments to vary the level of social distance between participants and
observers in this experiment, starting at a level that is already acutely lower than in the typical
laboratory experiment. We recruited the dictators for our experiment from people walking with
friends in a shopping mall. In the No Video treatment, the dictator is taken aside and given the
experimental task of allocating money to a stranger viewable from approximately forty feet
away. In the Video treatment, an experimenter explains to the participant that his or her decision
will be recorded and then positions the dictator in front of a running video camera before giving
the instructions on the decision task. In the Monitor treatment, the experimenter explains to the
participant and his or her companions that the participant’s decision will be recorded and
simultaneously displayed live on an LCD monitor at the research desk, where others can observe
the experiment, and importantly, where those personally known to the dictator can watch them
make the decision. These treatments glaringly reduce the social distance between the participant
and the experimenter, his or her peers, and anyone who might someday see the video recordings.
As a baseline, the No Video treatment decreases social distance between the dictator and
his or her peers, the dictatee, and the experimenters since anonymity is not provided. The Video
treatment further decreases social distance between the dictator and anyone who might watch the
video. The Monitor treatment even further reduces social distance between the dictator and both
his or her peers and the experimenters. We conduct an “artefactual field experiment” (Harrison
and List 2004).

Procedures
We conducted this experiment over two days at a high-traffic center of an indoor
shopping mall in California. Two of the authors, hearafter called recruiters RA(female) and

6

RB(male), recruited shoppers as they walked through the mall based on the following criteria:
the shoppers had to be in a group of at least two and multiple members of the group had to
appear to be at least eighteen years of age. The recruiters greeted the shoppers with the following
pitch: “Hello, I’m part of a research team at <insert university>. If you can spare five minutes to
participate in our study, we’ll pay you $5 for your time.” In most cases, shoppers stated they did
not have enough time and chose not to participate. Frey and Bohnet (1995) report that over 95
percent of students participated in the dictator game when it was conducted in their classroom;
most shoppers were not as willing, even with an offer of payment. Only 76 out of the 431
shoppers approached (17.6 percent) participated in our study. If shoppers asked questions about
the nature of the study, the recruiters emphasized that the study would be short, that it entailed no
risks, and that shoppers would be paid for their time, but gave no further details about the
experiment itself.
Once a shopper agreed to participate, the recruiter led him or her to a table where one of
two managers randomly assigned them to a treatment by the roll of a die. The treatment
determined the necessary paperwork for subject consent and permissions. For the Video and
Monitor treatments, the participant had to sign a consent form in order to be recorded, and all
participants, regardless of treatment, were also required to sign a consent form to participate as
well as a third form acknowledging the $5 payment.1 After the forms were completed and the
participant had been paid, instructor IA(male) or IB(male) led the participant away from the table
and the experiment began. At this point, participants still had no knowledge of the decision task.
See figure 1 for a diagram of the experiment.
While the paperwork was being handled at the desk, a third recruiter RC recruited
another shopper to participate as Player B. He approached shoppers and gave the following
1

Two shoppers declined to participate after reading over the consent forms.
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pitch: “Hello sir (ma’am). I’m part of a research team at <insert university>. I would like to
invite you to participate in a research study we are conducting in the mall. All you need to do is
stand here with me for about a minute, and you will have the chance to make money. Would you
like to?” RC approached shoppers who appeared to be over eighteen years of age and did not
appear to have any connection with the potential dictator.
After the subjects completed the paperwork and RC recruited another participant, the
experiment began. Instructor IA or IB read the following instructions, consistent across all three
treatments: “My colleague <RC name> has recruited another person to participate in this study.”2
Here the instructor paused and pointed to RC, who acknowledged the participant with a wave. “I
have $20.” At this point, the instructor displayed $20 cash in $1 bills. “How much of this $20
would you like me to take to that person over there? The rest is yours to keep.” We designed the
instructions to be as concise as possible. Short instructions minimize the time cost to participants
and ensure the instructions are delivered in a consistent, neutral way by IA and IB.
At this point, most participants paused to process the question, and many asked for
clarification. Once the subject made a decision, it was repeated to them for confirmation. The
instructor then paid the subject and walked the remaining cash over to RC and the dictatee
participant. The trial concluded with the other participant being paid and signing the paymentacknowledgement form.
To administer the No Video treatment, IA or IB led the participant away from the
research table. Subjects were taken away from the video camera so there was no confusion
regarding the possibility of being recorded. For the Video treatment, subjects were led in front of
the video camera before any instructions were given. Before the instructor led the participants
away for the Monitor treatment, a manager informed the participant and anyone with them that
2

IA and IB read the instructions from a clipboard to ensure consistent use of neutral language.
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the video of the experiment would be shown on the LCD monitor, and invited those not
participating to stay and watch.
The managers recorded data on all shoppers who were asked to participate over two days.
When a shopper was approached, a manager recorded who had delivered the pitch, the size of the
group, the gender of the person who responded, and whether the individual agreed to participate.
If they agreed, a manager recorded who delivered the instructions and their final decision. For
the Video and Monitor treatments, they also recorded the gender of the recipient.

Hypotheses
By conducting the dictator game in a public setting among strangers, we are limiting the
degree to which certain strategic concerns, including reciprocity from the dictatee and the
experimenter, will motivate offers. This aspect of the procedures tends to push offers toward zero
in the laboratory. However, by recording the decisions on video, participants lose a significant
degree of anonymity. The consent form grants permission to display the videos in a public
setting, making the decisions explicitly not anonymous. Further, by changing the setting from the
laboratory to a shopping mall, we are changing participant expectations. Undergraduates come to
the laboratory expecting to earn money, but shoppers do not go to the mall expecting to be paid.
These factors, we hypothesize, would tend to encourage dictators to give away some portion of
the endowment.
We utilize the No Video treatment as our baseline and compare the results to FHSS, the
first dictator game to use monetary rewards, because their results have been successfully
replicated by HMS. The social distance between the participants in this setting is comparatively
smaller than the social distance in a laboratory experiment, where subjects remain in separate
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rooms and do not directly make the decision in the physical presence of the experimenter. Thus,
we hypothesize that this will lead to higher offers than in the typical dictator-game experiment.
Because the social distance between subjects and the rest of the world decreases
dramatically in the Video treatment, we expect higher offers in this treatment than in the No
Video treatment. The Video consent form does not state explicitly what the video will be used
for, but only that it could involve “any communications medium currently existing or later
created, including without limitation print media, television, and the Internet.” This uncertainty,
combined with the social distance with respect to the dictatee, which is the same as it is in the No
Video treatment, will, we predict, lead subjects to offer more on average to their stranger
counterpart.
Finally, we expect the Monitor treatment will increase offers compared to both
treatments. In the other treatments and the typical laboratory experiment, participants can choose
to hide their decision from their peers, but in the Monitor treatment that possibility is removed.
Because of the immediate feedback that subjects will likely receive from their peers, we
hypothesize that participants will offer more in this treatment than in the No Video and Video
treatments. In sum, this treatment further reduces the social distance between the subject and his
or her immediate peer group, maintains relative to the Video treatment the same social distance
between the subject and anyone who might see the recording, and maintains relative to the No
Video treatment the same social distance between the subject and their counterpart participant.
In all treatments, we expect that the decreased social distance will make participants more
socially conscious of their decisions. Specifically, we expect that when people choose to make
low offers, or offers of zero, they will provide us with some justification. Although our
instructions do not prompt subjects to justify their decision, the dictator question is a peculiar
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one, after which the trial abruptly ends. We expect that some subjects will volunteer to explain
why they chose to make their offer.

III. Results
We collected data on 22, 28, and 23 dictators in the No Video, Video, and Monitor
treatments, respectively.3 Given the prior sensitivity of the results to the procedures in
conducting dictator games, we recorded additional details not normally reported in the dictatorgame research, including which researcher recruited the subject and which researcher asked the
dictator to make a decision. We also collected general information on the people who declined to
participate in the study, and we transcribed what the participants on video said during the
experiment. As an overview of the results, figure 2 reports the frequency distribution of the
offers by treatment and broken down by who recruited the subject.
We begin by comparing our treatments against the FHSS and HMS baseline. Table 1
reports one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum and (two-sided) Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the
percentage of the total pie offered in our treatments with those offered in FHSS and HMS.
All treatments were significantly different from the FHSS+HMS baseline, though the
Video treatment is marginally so with the Wilcoxon test (p-value = 0.0582). This supports our
more general hypothesis that the amount given increases as the social distance decreases between
the dictator and the dictatee and between the dictator and the experimenter and between the
dictator and the general public (in the Video treatment).
Jointly comparing our three treatments, a Kruskal-Wallis test indicates marginal support
with an unordered alternative (KW = 5.41, p-value = 0.0668), but a Jonckheere test for ordered

3

We omit three observations in the Monitor treatment for which the dictatee left before the dictator had made a final
decision. Incidentally, the three offers are $0, $5, and $10.
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alternatives is highly insignificant (J22,28,23 = –0.15, p-value = 0.5625). We investigate this
further with one-sided pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum tests, the results for which we report in table
2.
One part of our ordered hypothesis is borne out. Subjects in the Monitor treatment give
significantly more money away than subjects in the Video treatment. The average offers in the
Monitor and Video treatments are $11.78 and $8.14, respectively. There is no statistically
significant difference between the Video and the No Video treatment. The average offer in the No
Video treatment is $12.27, which is greater than the average in the other treatments. Ex post, we
identified another difference between the No Video and the Video and Monitor treatments: the
extra consent form for photographic consent and release. Perhaps there is an unanticipated and
implicit exchange at play here. Subjects who fill out an extra page of a consent form for the
Video treatment may feel more entitled to keep money in exchange for the release of their image
into the public domain. The Monitor treatment nearly fully offsets that difference between the No
Video and Video treatments.
It is plausible that the social-distance phenomenon is still operating here, ceteris paribus,
but the camera is adding an additional effect not explained by social distance. To explore this
more fully by controlling for other variables, we estimate a Tobit model of the offers with both
upper- and lower-tail censoring. Table 3 summarizes the model and reports its estimates.
Marginal effects are reported in table 4.
Consistent with the nonparametric statistics above, the Video treatment decreases the
amount that dictators offer, and thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative that video recording increases the amount that dictators give. The estimated marginal
effect is -$3.93. Most of this decrease is offset when the monitor is added to the video recording
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procedures (p-value = 0.0241). The marginal effect of including a monitor for the subject’s group
members to watch is $3.67.
The sex of the dictator and the day the subject participated in the experiment are both
insignificant (p-values = 0.5461 and 0.1008, respectively). One indication of just how sensitive
this experiment is to the procedures is that the recruiter had a significant impact on the offer that
the dictator made (p-value = 0.0002). Being recruited by the female recruiter (RA) reduced the
amount offered by the dictator by a nontrivial $6.37 (in the Video treatment), despite the fact that
neither RA nor RB consciously selected for any characteristic. Moreover, it is worth repeating
that the recruiters are not involved in the decision-making process of the dictator. RA and RB
merely invite the mall shoppers to participate and then escort the subject to the main table, where
the managers administered the consent forms for the experiment. (At this point, the subjects still
have no knowledge of their decision task.) Instructor IA or IB then escorts the subjects to the
specific spot where the formal experiment is administered. This procedural detail also has a
significant effect on the offers of the dictator. IA is significant (p-value = 0.0500) and has an
estimated marginal effect of -$5.45 (in the Video treatment).
We also collected data on the mall shoppers we solicited to participate in the experiment.
Using these data, we estimate a probit model to assess what variables, if any, affect the
probability of a shopper agreeing to participate. This is particularly interesting in light of the
recruiter effect found above. Are shoppers more or less likely to accept the invitation to
participate from RA, the recruiter who appears to have the effect of reducing the offers of the
dictators? The binary left-hand variable equals 1 if the shopper agreed to participate and 0
otherwise. Table 5 reports the estimates and table 6 the marginal effects.
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The only significant variable is Female (p-value = 0.0423). At the average group size of
2.22, a female mall shopper is 7.6 percentage points less likely to accept the invitation than a
male respondent. Notably, RA has no significant effect on the probability that a shopper decides
to participate (p-value = 0.6478), which indicates that RA is not differentially recruiting people
for the experiment relative to RB, even though dictators recruited by RA offer significantly less
to their counterparts. The insignificant estimate of Day2 indicates that the success rate of the
recruiters does not change with a day’s worth of experience (p-value = 0.2669)

IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The video record and the impromptu responses of the dictators while on camera offer a
look into the subjects’ perception of this task. A sample of the videos can be viewed at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZHN8xyp6Y0. We report all transcribed responses in
appendix A. Several of the dictators that give nothing justify their decision with the rhetorical
question “Why should I give him [or her] anything?” Others seek approval from the
experimenter by asking whether offering nothing is a “good” or “wrong” response. Noticeably,
no subject who gives $10 or more reports any compunction regarding their decision. If anything,
they are delighted to give money to the other person. These responses also reveal a wide
divergence in the perception of the property right over the money. Whereas one dictator who
gives nothing asks, “Why you gonna give him any money at all? He has to earn it,” another has
the completely opposite perception: “Seeing as it’s not really my money, you can give all of it to
her.” Several dictators who send $10 use the word “half” or “fair,” which suggests importing a
heuristic or rule. One subject who gave half added, “I’m a nice guy.”
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Finally, many subjects are just plain baffled by the decision task. Many a quizzical look
accompanies the utterance “That’s it?” when the decision task ends. Or as one woman exclaimed
as she returned to her husband at the monitor station, “This is bizarre!” The dictator game is
bizarre for the participants because we, following the convention in conducting such
experiments, intentionally stripped the decision of a specific social context, and people do not
normally make interdependent decisions in a contextual vacuum. While people do not regularly
allocate windfall money to random shoppers in a mall, there’s no reason to assume they would
not be generous to a stranger in the familiar context of a charity or compete against that stranger
in a contest. The large symmetric variance in the offers across treatments is perhaps the result of
the different social contexts that participants in each offer category personally imposed on the
experiment, which prompted them to behave generously, equitably, or stingily toward a stranger.
If the dictator game is a simple, straightforward game for the economists who study it, it isn’t so
clear-cut for the average shopper in a mall. (Watch for the bewildered looks on the faces of the
participants in the YouTube video.) Social context matters, for if the experimenter does not
provide one, the participant will.
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Ha :
Wilcoxon test
p-value

Ha :
Kolmogorov-

No Video

> FHSS+HMS

Video

> FHSS+HMS

Monitor

> FHSS+HMS

W52,22 = 928

W52,28 = 884

W52,23 = 941

<0.0001

0.0582

<0.0001

No Video

≠ FHSS+HMS

Video

≠ FHSS+HMS

Monitor

≠ FHSS+HMS

D52,22 = 0.5105

D52,28 = 0.3022

D52,23 = 0.5569

0.0004

0.0499

0.0001

Smirnov test
p-value

Table 1. Comparisons with FHSS and HMS offers
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Wn,m (p-value)
No Video

Video

Video

Monitor

413

258.5

(0.9798)

(0.5488)
414.5
(0.0400)

Table 2. Pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between treatments
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Variable

Description

Constant

Estimate

p-value

16.16

<0.0001

-8.81

0.0002

-7.33

0.0500

1.90

0.8055

4.02

0.1008

Subjects recruited by RA = 1;
RA
subjects recruited by RB = 0.
Decision administered by IA = 1;
IA
decision administered by IB = 0.
RA x IA

Interaction
Experiment conducted on day 2 =

Day2

1; experiment conducted on day 1
= 0.

0.9661†

Video and Monitor treatments = 1;
-5.36

Video
No Video treatment = 0.
Monitor treatment =1;
Monitor

Video and No Video treatments =

4.95

0.0241†

1.24

0.5461

0.
Female*

Female dictator = 1;
male dictator = 0.

†

One-side test; two-sided otherwise.

*

We did not collect data on the sex of the dictatee in the No Video treatment.

Table 3. Tobit model of offers (left censored at 0; right censored at 20)
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Baseline

Additional variable
evaluated at 1

Marginal
effect

All variables evaluated at 0
Video

-$3.93

Day2

$2.29

Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0.

Monitor

$3.67

Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0.

RA

-$6.37

Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0.

IA

-$5.45

(No Video treatment)
All variables evaluated at 0
(No Video treatment)

Table 4. Estimated marginal effects for Tobit model
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Variable

Description

Constant

Estimate

p-value

-1.11

0.0004

-0.29

0.0423

0.13

0.2976

-0.07

0.6478

0.17

0.2669

Sex of the person in the group of
Female
shoppers who was recruited.
Total number of people in the group of
GroupSize the person who was recruited (minimum
= 2).
Subject recruited by RA = 1; subject
RA
recruited by RB = 0.
Experiment conducted on day 2 = 1;
Day2
experiment conducted on day 1 = 0.
N = 431
Table 5. Probit model of shopper agreeing to participate in the experiment
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Baseline

Additional variable
evaluated at 1

Marginal
effect

GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all
Female

-0.076

RA

-0.017

Day2

0.043

other variables equal 0.
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all
other variables equal 0.
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all
other variables equal 0.

Non-dichotomous variable
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all
GroupSize
other variables equal 0.

Table 6. Estimated marginal effects for probit model

0.032
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Figure 1. Experiment diagram
The dictator moves through three stations in the Monitor treatment as indicated by the
circled numbers. First, the dictator is recruited by researcher RA. Second, the dictator completes
paperwork and leaves his or her companions at the table with managers MA and MB. Third, the
dictator performs the decision task with the receiver, Player B, indicated by the cross, in view
about 40 feet away. Player B was recruited from passing shoppers by RC. Instructions for the
decision task are given by instructor IA and the payment to Player B, if any, is delivered by IA.
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Figure 2. Distribution of offers
Some dictators gifted the entire amount and the modal outcome was a 50/50 split.
Dictators recruited by recruiter RB were more generous on average.
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Appendix A
For a look into the subjects’ perceptions of this task, we report here a transcription
of the impromptu responses of the dictators while on camera, broken down by how much
they offer to the other person. The left two columns contain the dictator responses for
offers less than $10, the middle two columns for offers of $9 and $10, and the right two
columns for offers greater than $10.
Comment

Offer

Comment

Offer

Comment

Offer

“Why you gonna give him
any money at all? He has
to earn it. Zero.”
“That's the game? So I get
this money just for that?”

0

“How much of that?”
“That much [points
out random amount].”

9

“[looks around
confused] umm…
about 13 for
them.”

13

“Zero. [laughs]”
“Is that a good answer?
Yeah.”

0

“Umm… 10? Split it
in half?”

10

“That person over
there? I'd say 15.”

15

“I'll take it all. Why do I
give her any?”
“All right. Here you go.”
“That's all? Are you
serious? [laughs]”

0

“Half.”
“Yeah. That's it?”

10

“How much? 15?
[shrugs] OK,
thank you.”

15

10

“How much of
that 20 you should
take over there
and the rest is
mine? How about
8, 8? No, give him
15; the rest is
fine.”

15

10

“Really? 15.”

15

“Why would I send any of
it?”
“Nothing. Send her
nothing!”
“That's it?”

“Give it to me.”
“Yes.”

0

0

“[shrugs] Umm…I
would say half and
half. Sounds fair
enough.”

“The person in the
purple? Uh I'll split it
with her. Give her
10.”
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“Do I have to, like, say the
reasons?”
“I wouldn't want them to
take any of it. I'll take 20.”
“Why?”
“And why should I give to
him $20? [shakes her
head].”
[laughs, consults mother
and father] “OK, nothing.”

0

“Uh… [shakes head]
10.”

10

“[shrugs] 20
bucks.”
“20. That's it?”

20

20

0

“I don't know.
Whatever. $10.”

10

“How much of the
$20 you should
take over to that
person? I don't
know; the whole
20. I don't care.”

0

“How much do you
have there? You have
$20 there and you're
wondering how much
I think you should
give to him, and how
much you should give
to me? 10 to him, 10
to me.”
“Might be a little
tricky. There's 10
here. So I give this to
you? [to camera
man].”

10

“[shrugs] All of
it?”
“All of it.”

20

1

“Umm, half of it?”
“That's it?”

10

“You can give it
to them if you
want.”
“Yeah, sure.”

20

“What do you mean?”
“One. That it?”

1

“Which one?”
“Oh, the lady on the
square. How much,
20? Ones? We gonna
go to a strip club with
that afterwards?
Half—give her half.”

10

“It's up to you. It's
not my money.”
“It's my money?”
“[laughs] That's
pretty funny.
Seeing as it's not
really my money
you can give all of
it to her.”

20

“So you're just gonna take
it to your colleague and
give it to that guy? Give
him $1.”

1

“10 and 10. I think
that's fair.”

10

“Umm… Give her
all of it, I guess.”

20

“I'll just take it all.”

“$1.”
“Is that wrong? [starts to
follow] Is that it?”

26

“Of the $20? Umm, a
dollar?”
“Oh, no, giving them the
dollar.”

“$3”
“Yeah.”

“Half. Actually I'll take 15;
he'll take 5.”

“5?”
“Yeah.”

1

“Half [shrugs]. That's
it? You're gonna give
that to him?”

10

“OK. Which
one?”
“The white shirt?
Give him all of
it.”

3

“5 bucks the same
thing”
“Oh for myself? I'll
give him the even
amount I have.”
“Yeah: 10 and 10.”

10

“Umm.. All of it?”
“Yeah, thanks.”

20

10

“Give it to them.”
“Yeah! [jumps up
and down over to
friends] I just gave
that guy money!”

20

20

20

5

“10?”
“Yeah.”

5

“What person?”
“Well, he looks kind
of hungry so I'll say 10
bucks each?”
“Yeah. That's it?”

10

“To give to her?”
“Well, give her 20
’cause I've already
got a 5.”

“How much should
you take over to her?”
“Half?”

10

“All of it
[shrugs]”

“Why do I have to
give him money?”
“I don't know? 10
bucks?”
“Really?”

10

“Half, half of
whatever's there. I'm a
nice guy. That's it?
Really?”

10

“Umm… Half?”

10

“I'll give 'em 10.”

10

20
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Appendix B
Experimental instructions
Pitch for dictator:
Excuse me. I’m part of a research team at Chapman University. We’ve randomly selected you to
participate in our study. It will take less than five minutes and we’ll give you $5 for your time.
Are you interested?

Instructions for dictator:
<RC name> has randomly selected another person over there. How much of this $20 should we
take to the person with <RC name>? The rest is yours.

Pitch for dictatee
Excuse me. I’m part of a research team at Chapman University. We’ve randomly selected you to
participate in our study. All you have to do is stand here with me for a minute or two and you
may receive cash. Are you interested?

Instructions for dictatee:
Just stand here with me and one of my colleagues will be over in just a minute.

